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19 JUL 1966

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Department of Defense Representatives on the DOD Vietnam Summer Study Project, held at CIA Headquarters, 18 July 1966, 11 a.m.

PRESENT: Col. Marshall Sanders, ISA/Office of Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense

Mr. Leonard Wainstein, IDA-WSEG

Mr. Charles E. Fritz, IDA-WSEG

25X1A9a Delbert Arnold, IDA-WSEG

[REDACTED] EXPS/RR, CIA

1. Background: On 11 July, Mr. John T. McNaughton wrote to the Director of Central Intelligence concerning the subject study project. From now until its conclusion, the project is to concentrate on the four areas specified in the letter. The letter requested CIA assistance in carrying out the balance of the project; it specifically mentioned contact with selected individuals and groups in CIA. The undersigned was named CIA Control Officer for the project by the Acting DD/I. The meeting to be described below was arranged at the request of Colonel Sanders, ISA, and was for the purpose of briefing the undersigned on the objectives of the project and CIA support required. The undersigned had been instructed by the Acting DD/I to listen but to make no immediate commitments. The Acting DD/I also advised the undersigned that Sanders and Company wanted access to published intelligence as well as to CIA personnel.

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2. At the meeting, Colonel Sanders stated that Mr. Fritz, with the assistance of Mr. Arnold, was making a bomb damage study of North Vietnam, and that Mr. Wainstein was concentrating on logistics and manpower to South Vietnam. Colonel Sanders had already talked to [REDACTED] DIA, who had put him in touch with [REDACTED] of DIA. [REDACTED] in turn had put the project members in touch with the appropriate DIA analysts, and had made certain documents available to them. DIA had also given DIA a list of questions dealing with the data base used to make bomb damage assessments and to estimate the movement of men and materiel to South Vietnam. Mr. Fritz explained that one of the immediate purposes of the exercise was to take a careful look at the data used to determine if there were any differences within the Intelligence Community and to establish, if possible, how the differences arose. The ultimate purpose was to make specific suggestions to the Secretary of Defense about ways in which the U.S. effort in Vietnam could be improved.

3. Mr. Fritz, Mr. Wainstein, and Mr. Arnold had been identified to me as Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) personnel. Actually, they are Institute of Defense Analysis (IDA) contractor personnel who wear a WSEG hat. Colonel Sanders implied to me that DIA had given IDA personnel access to National Intelligence Estimates. I therefore reminded him that such estimates were not supposed to be shown to contractor personnel. I also told him that there should be no particular problem in providing other finished intelligence to IDA personnel, in view of the fact that they were contractors for a USIB member agency. In this connection, I read him the pertinent portions of USIB D-39.5/19, "USIB Policy on Release of Intelligence to Contractors", and suggested that he secure a copy.

4. Colonel Sanders stated that he would like to serve on us the same questions he had served on DIA, and then hold a discussion with the appropriate CIA experts. The CIA experts would also be asked if there

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was any pertinent finished intelligence available beyond that which had been supplied by DIA. After reading the list of questions, I stated that such a session could be arranged. I further suggested, however, that the first session be only with OHR personnel who could cover most, but not all, of the DOD questions. It was apparent, however, that DOD wanted not only answers to substantive questions, but to questions on sources and methods. I reminded the DOD representatives that such information could be highly sensitive, and that we would have to exercise care in supplying it. This point was understood and agreed to. I also asked Colonel Sanders to send me a list of the documents that had been supplied to the study group by DIA. I proposed to send their questions and this list to [REDACTED] Chief, D/T for study. [REDACTED] would then call Colonel Sanders and arrange a mutually acceptable time for a meeting. This was also agreed to.

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5. On the morning of July 19 I delivered the list of questions to [REDACTED] and briefed him on the session of 18 July. I cautioned [REDACTED] not to make any commitments at the meeting, particularly with respect to the transmittal of published intelligence. I repeated to him what I had said to the DOD representatives about the restrictions on the use of NIE's and about the sensitivity of information on sources and methods.

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